Does the neo-Aristotelian ethics that has been developed according to the program from G. E. M. Anscombe in 1958 exclude the notion of morality? Anscombe was challenging the relevance of the concept of "moral duty". Does it imply that, to follow her, one must give up any distinction between "moral" and "non-moral"? The defence of a moral absolutism motivated Anscombe's "intention" analyses. Critics of legalism, consequentialism or the subjectivism conducted in the wake of "Modern Moral Philosophy" by main representatives of neo-Aristotelian ethics – Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Rosalind Hursthouse or Martha C. Nussbaum – respond to the same type of concern. The neo-Aristotelians, despite their disagreement on many points, seek to set the idea of a homogeneous practical rationality against modern conceptions of moral rationality. But it is to show that rationality is intrinsically linked with virtue. In the same spirit, they set a non-reductionist naturalism against the anti-naturalist British ethics of the 20th century. Under these different aspects, their reflection benefits from getting back to the original inspiration of Anscombe’s "psychology" method. This is also what allows some of them to lay the foundations of an ethical theory based on notions of virtue and happiness, whether it claims its belonging to "virtue ethics" or not. Through its definition of "human action", this ethical theory, which proposes to reconnect with certain characteristics of Ancient ethics implies, however, a demanding and original definition of morality.
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